A Reuters report, filed from Sorkhdoz, in Helmand says:
The mullah’s message was blunt. We don’t trust you and if you don’t earn our trust, our first meeting will be our last.
With that, he stood abruptly and walked out of his first “shura,” or council meeting, with U.S. Marines.
U.S. forces who have moved deep into formerly Taliban-controlled territory in southern Afghanistan this week say they are here to stay and will not leave until they have improved the lives of ordinary people.
But locals — used to seeing NATO troops come through to fight but fail to follow through on promises of development — may not be won over easily.
This Reuters story (read the full text here) aptly describes what an uphill battle Marines in Helmand have in front of them — not fighting the Taliban, who have melted into the countryside — but winning the trust of ordinary people. This story contains the key to winning the villagers’ trust:
Mullah Zainuddin, the village’s religious leader, listed their demands.
They want the provincial authorities to allocate more water for their irrigation system. They want a health clinic, and they want a school. Produce these things or leave us alone, he said.
“I do not trust you. There have been international forces that have come through the village and promised schools, promised clinics. When you are already (delivering) that, then I will trust you,” he said.
“We are out of patience here. If you do not do these things and solve these problems, we will leave this village. We will fight: every man, woman and child, we do not fear death.”
One thing that always struck me as I researched my book, Seeds of Terror, is that villagers like Mullah Zainuddin, who are clearly wavering between the Taliban and the Kabul government, do not have particularly tall orders. Listen to what this guy says: He wants the irrigation system in his village fixed (probably so the people can grow something other than poppy, which is drought resistant), a health clinic and a school. These are not huge demands folks. Let’s make them happen. And fast!
This excellent Washington Post report described the type of grandiose development schemes I watched fail all over the country — and even describes one of the most absurd I personally came across (and describe in Seeds of Terror) a project to build cobblestone roads in southern Afghanistan (a place that needs everything, except for more bumpy roads).
My experience is that Afghan people aren’t expecting much — just good security, some jobs, a school (both for boys AND girls) and medical care. Wow. Not so different from what we want here in the U.S.
On June 9 I posted this blog arguing that proposals to legalize Afghanistan’s poppy crop are premature.
This is one of the responses I received:
Hi – just to let you know, there IS indeed a biofuels company willing to do the tough job in Afghanistan – and we’re actually here on the ground now! Our company, Afghan Eco-Fuels, is pursuing the establishment of a biodiesel processing plant here in Afghanistan. While you mention the South, it is equally important to secure the support of the northern provinces. We are looking at establishing a proof-of-concept in the MeZ area first, then expanding the model across the country. It must be bottom-up driven, with grass roots support in order to have any chance of success. Unfortunately, the “donor community” as well as other sources of financial support have not been forthcoming with the necessary capital required to accomplish such a feat. We are here, and we are ready – where is everyone else?
This is my response:
Wow, what a surprise! A bio-fuel company saying they are ready to “do the tough job” in the north (where there are far fewer security problems). On the one hand, I applaud you, because people in northern Afghanistan need development and job opportunities too. And a bio-fuel project in northern Afghanistan could serve as a model for future programs in the south ONCE IT HAS BEEN STABILIZED.
But the fact remains that the chorus of “experts” saying “we should just buy the poppy” or “we should just turn it into medicine/bio-fuel” or whatever always either imply or state directly that this strategy will kneecap the insurgents. IT WILL NOT. I am tired of the legalization argument diverting attention from what Afghanistan (and Pakistan) urgently need. That is LAW AND ORDER.
On Sunday the New York Times published an interesting report about U.S. soldiers trying to secure Afghanistan’s Jalrez District, a fertile valley just east of the capital Kabul that was being terrorized by a combination of Taliban forces and local criminals. The story reports that the Taliban melted away when American forces appeared, and their main task now is targeting criminal groups “who may be thought of as Taliban, but whose main pursuit is money, not infidels.”
Lt. Col. Kimo Gallahue, a commander of the U.S. battalion in Jalrez commented to the Times that, “I learned everything I know about the Jalrez insurgency from The Sopranos … At the foot soldier level, it’s economically driven.”
First off, from my research it is clear the insurgency — both in Afghanistan and Pakistan — is economically driven right up to the top of the command chain. But the point I want to make in this post is that it is absurd American troops have to take their cue from an HBO show. As the Obama administration overhauls its strategy towards Afghanistan, the Pentagon should train and equip U.S. fighting units in Afghanistan to counter an enemy that behaves more like a mafia force than an ideological guerilla army. That means, among other things, embedding law enforcement and counter-narcotics officers in military units deployed to Afghanistan, and also refashioning the training programs soldiers undergo before they deploy. A criminal intelligence investigation is different from a military intelligence operation, but the two can complement each other in the current environment in Afghanistan. U.S. and European officials should mull revisions to the mandate for NATO troops in Afghanistan that would allow them to combat criminal activity both by insurgents and corrupt officials in the Afghan government. Good governance in Afghanistan will be critical to any counter insurgency effort.
The criminalized Taliban has not put aside its intention of driving western troops out of the country or launching lethal attacks, as the rising casualty rates indicate. In fact, involvement in crime has made the insurgency more violent and ruthless.
In addition, there is evidence this planting season that Taliban forces in the country’s west are threatening farmers with dire consequences if they do not grow opium poppy. A report by the UN’s news service, IRIN, quoted poppy farmers in Farah province:
“The Taliban told me to grow poppies or I would be punished,” said Abdul Sattar, a farmer in the Poshtroad District, in southwestern Farah Province.
“They say by growing opium [poppies] we are actually demonstrating our support for ‘jihad’ against the Americans,” said Abdul Majid, another farmer.
The report goes onto say that Taliban forces in Farah have doubled the agricultural tax they normally impose on poppy farmers, this season saying they would cart off as much as 20 percent of their crop. In my research for Seeds of Terror, farmers in southern Afghanistan reported that Taliban soldiers usually carted off 10 percent of their crop — an agricultural tithe known locally as ushr.
Please see today’s New York Times story about an army captain in Ghazni province fighting for the release of a young man he believes has been wrongly accused. I often argue we ought to deploy beat cops to work the streets of Afghanistan because they would best understand the situation we face there. Capt. Black, himself a former police officer from Baltimore, is just the kind of person we should be listening to, not charging with insubordinance.
