Gretchen Peters

The U.S. government has announced that it will be reshaping counter narcotics strategy in Afghanistan to increase efforts to interdict smugglers and traffickers and take the focus off crop eradication, which has hurt poor farmers.

This is a welcome change. As the Obama administration’s special envoy to the region Richard Holbrooke put it, the policies of the Bush administration — which pushed grandiose development plans and wide-scale crop eradication — largely failed:

“They did not result in any damage to the Taliban, but they put farmers out of work and they alienated people and drove people into the arms of the Taliban.”

To support this shift in focus, the U.S. military (not to mention troops from other NATO nations operating in Afghanistan) will have to reshape its efforts from the ground up to accommodate this shift in focus. There are two main areas where they will have to change their behavior, one is how they interact with locals, and speak about the Taliban and al Qaeda (in other words, a public relations campaign) and the other is how they collect intelligence. Every U.S. soldier in Afghanistan plays a critical role, right down to the grunt on patrol.

First, public relations. American forces in Afghanistan should stop using words like jihadi, mujahidin and Taliban to refer to the enemy, because these are actually complementary terms for them. I like the suggestion made by counter insurgency expert David Kilcullen in his brilliant book The Accidental Guerilla that they use the term ‘taqfiri,’ or heretic. As I say in my presenations on the book, the Taliban use two bogus arguments among the local populace to rationalize trafficking drugs. One bogus argument is that, even though Islam’s holy book, the Koran, bans the use, cultivation and traffic in all narcotics, it gives you a pass in times of war (it does not). The other bogus argument they use is that the Koran allows you to traffic in drugs as long as you sell them only to non-Muslims (it doesn’t, and they don’t). Almost none of Afghanistan’s drug crop ends up in the United States, while Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran — all Muslim nations — have skyrocketing addiction rates.  If coalition forces talk about the Taliban as heretics and criminals, they will have a better chance of winning public support.

Second, collecting intelligence. U.S. soldiers patrolling the mountains, villages and poppy fields of Afghanistan are no different than the cops who walk the beat on U.S. streets. They have a valuable role in collecting ground level information about how the enemy funds himself. If a military patrol intercepts a guy with a drug shipment, find out who he got it from, and more importantly, who he is taking it to. Don’t ask him if he knows where Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar is. Would a New York City beat cop busting a cocaine pusher ask him where to find Pablo Escobar? No, but that low-level smuggler is part of a chain. He will have information about the guy above him on the chain, and that guy will have information about the guy above him. Follow the chain. Follow the money.

Watch my appearance on Good Morning America Weekend here about the escape of New York Times reporter David Rohde and his translator Tahir Ludin after seven months in Taliban captivity. Kidnapping has become a growth industry for the Taliban on both sides of the AfPak border, and the case of Rohde, Ludin and driver Asadullah Mangal was typical in that the threesome was kidnapped by a local criminal gang inside Afghanistan and then sold up the insurgent chain of command to end up in a compound in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The camp was run by the Haqqani Group, under the command of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the son of the legendary mujahidin commander Jalaluddin Haqqani (see my dossiers page for more on Dad). 

Rohde and his associates were by no means unique victims of the kidnapping problem along the AfPak border. The vast majority of the people abducted come from middle class and wealthy Pakistani and Afghan families. Thousands have fled the border areas, or moved out of the country, because of this growing problem. 

When Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnapped in January 2002, his captors intended to make a statement, and they did so by beheading him and releasing a grisly video of his execution. It shocked the world. When David Rohde was kidnapped, his abductors intended to make money — lots of it. In their first request, they asked almost $30 million for his release, according to Western and Afghan officials, along with the release of high value Taliban prisoners being held by the US military. 

The Taliban demand smaller ransoms for locals they kidnap, but the issue is the same. Kidnapping is now a central pillar of the Taliban’s criminal economy. 

By the way, you can also watch me on PBS’s Newshour here.

A Taliban fighter recently killed by NATO troops in southern Afghanistan was found to have a tattoo from the Aston Villa Football Club, indicating he may have grown up in Britain’s West Midlands. It was the latest evidence that British Muslims of South Asian origin have joined the fight in Afghanistan. (Read the full report here)

For some time, Royal Air Force spy planes have picked up radio communication between Taliban fighters who speak with thick accents from Manchester, Birmingham, West Bromwich and Bradford, all cities with large populations of British Muslims of South Asian origin.

“But it was a shock to hear that the guys we were fighting against supported the same football clubs as us, and maybe even grew up on the same streets as us,” the Telegraph newspaper quoted an unnamed British military official as saying. 

Some law enforcement officials believe the British Taliban fighters may have links to criminal gangs in the UK whose members are Muslim and who have been connected to selling heroin on British streets. At least one other captured Taliban fighter was found to have British gang tattoos on his arms, according to a western law enforcement advisor to the U.S. military, and there is evidence that various British Muslim gangs have sent fighters to Afghanistan, or sell Afghan heroin on British streets.

The Gambinos, gangsters of Pakistani origin who take their name from the New York crime family, have been linked to selling Afghan heroin in north London and Luton.  So have the South Man Syndicate (SMS) and the Muslim Boys (who are also known as the PDC, or Poverty Driven Children).

“The big bosses have Taliban and al Qaeda connections and we’re often told only to deal it to non-Muslims. They call it chemical jihad and hope to ruin lives while getting massive payouts at the same time,” said a street dealer quoted in this British tabloid.

Members of the Muslim Boys, a gang of Afro-Caribbean Muslim converts (many of who converted to Islam in prison) have boasted to the British media of their links to to al Qaeda, although British officials admit it is hard to tell how much is bravado and how much is a sign of a concrete relationship between extremists in South Asia and the Muslim gangs of the UK.

But some British law enforcement officials believe the link is there – and cause for serious worry. Lee Jasper, the chair of the Lambeth police consultative group has expressed concerns that “the leaders of the Muslim Boys could be a criminalized front for terrorist extremists” in Britain.

On June 9 I posted this blog arguing that proposals to legalize Afghanistan’s poppy crop are premature. 

This is one of the responses I received:

Hi – just to let you know, there IS indeed a biofuels company willing to do the tough job in Afghanistan – and we’re actually here on the ground now! Our company, Afghan Eco-Fuels, is pursuing the establishment of a biodiesel processing plant here in Afghanistan. While you mention the South, it is equally important to secure the support of the northern provinces. We are looking at establishing a proof-of-concept in the MeZ area first, then expanding the model across the country. It must be bottom-up driven, with grass roots support in order to have any chance of success. Unfortunately, the “donor community” as well as other sources of financial support have not been forthcoming with the necessary capital required to accomplish such a feat. We are here, and we are ready – where is everyone else?

This is my response:

Wow, what a surprise! A bio-fuel company saying they are ready to “do the tough job” in the north (where there are far fewer security problems). On the one hand, I applaud you, because people in northern Afghanistan need development and job opportunities too. And a bio-fuel project in northern Afghanistan could serve as a model for future programs in the south ONCE IT HAS BEEN STABILIZED.

But the fact remains that the chorus of “experts” saying “we should just buy the poppy” or “we should just turn it into medicine/bio-fuel” or whatever always either imply or state directly that this strategy will kneecap the insurgents. IT WILL NOT. I am tired of the legalization argument diverting attention from what Afghanistan (and Pakistan) urgently need. That is LAW AND ORDER.

Three Cups of Tea, the lovely book by mountaineer-turned-humanitarian Greg Mortenson, has captivated American readers and held its position on the New York Times best seller list since January 2007. 

Nonetheless, many Americans have no idea about the humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Pakistan, where more than 2.4 million people have fled the Taliban in the Swat Valley and countless more have fled the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA, better known here as the “tribal belt.” 

Ahmed Rashid, author of the Taliban and Descent into Chaos, has written an excellent editorial in today’s Washington Post that spells out clearly why we as a nation must help the people of Pakistan. He writes: 

The mass exodus from the battle zone to the southern plains has been the largest and fastest displacement of people since the genocide in Rwanda 15 years ago, U.N. officials say. … U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has warned that the United Nations may be forced to cut all its services, including food supplies, by July if its appeal for $543 million in emergency aid goes unmet. After nearly a month, donor countries have pledged only 20 percent of that. The International Committee of the Red Cross — the only aid agency working with civilians wounded from the fighting and with those civilians who have remained in the destroyed towns of Swat — seeks $38 million, which would double its Pakistan budget for this year.

Rashid notes that President Obama has pledged $310 million to help the people of northwest Pakistan, making him “the the only world leader concerned” about them. Arab and European nations have so far not coughed up any major aid packages. 

Times are tough, but I encourage the American people to follow Obama’s lead and send what they can to help the people of Pakistan. Many excellent aid groups are hard at work there, including Greg Mortenson’s CAI, Mercy Corps and Doctor’s Without Borders. 

As Rashid points out:

Strategically, much is at stake. The fighting in Swat is not just against extremism but for the hearts and minds of future generations. 

We are fighting an insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda, and in any counter-insurgency effort the best weapons don’t shoot. By helping to stabilize Pakistan, we will not only make the world a better place, we will make our own nation safer. Unless that happens — and happens fast, the world is “sleepwalking its way to defeat” in Pakistan, as Rashid writes. And the cost of doing too little could be enormous.

In my public presentations about Seeds of Terror, I’m frequently asked for my opinion on proposals to bulk purchase or simply legalize Afghanistan’s poppy crop, either for use in pharmaceuticals or as a bio-fuel.

The questions usually go: “Wouldn’t it be easier if we just bought all the poppy?” Or: “Shouldn’t we just take all that opium and put it into legal drugs?” 

And there’s something to that. I think it’s entirely possible that opium poppy grown legally and hygienically in Afghanistan could one day help supply what the International Council on Security and Development calls a critical shortage of pain killer in the developing world. 

I am also intrigued by recent proposals that include ideas to distribute genetically modified poppy seeds, that would not produce narcotic opium, as part of a broad effort to develop alternative livelihoods. In that case the crop could be harvested and processed to make diesel bio-fuel and animal feed. One of the study’s authors tells me Afghan farmers stand to earn almost as much as they currently do selling opium poppy on the black market and it would not have a negative impact on food production.

These are good proposals but they will work only after Afghanistan has been stabilized, and rule of law is established. 

However if Afghanistan’s poppy crop were legalized tomorrow, there would neither be the infrastructure nor the resources in place to regulate the world’s largest opium crop.

Who will make sure it gets sold to pharmaceutical companies and not to drug traffickers? I bet it won’t be Afghanistan’s notoriously corrupt police, many of whom also profit off the drug trade. 

And who will ensure it gets harvested hygienically? Afghanistan’s Food and Drug Administration? Oh wait, there isn’t one.

Is there a bio-fuel firm that’s ready and eager to build a processing plant in lawless southern Afghanistan? Are there volunteers willing to risk their lives in the war-torn poppy belt to train locals to run it?

Those are only the basic obstacles. The real issue is much larger – and not ours alone to assess: It’s easy for us to sit here in the United States and talk about legalizing Afghanistan’s poppy crop, since almost none of the opiates produced there end up on US streets (and in fact, heroin use in this country is declining, according to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health).

Folks have a different perspective on legalization proposals in places like Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia and Russia, where heroin addiction rates are skyrocketing. Russia, which has the world’s largest number of heroin addicts, has called on the United Nations to mandate that international troops in Afghanistan launch an aggressive poppy eradication campaign.

It isn’t possible to talk about Afghanistan in terms of “wouldn’t it be easier if…” or “shouldn’t we just…” 

There will be nothing easy about stabilizing Afghanistan. And there is no silver bullet strategy to magically transform it into a “Central Asian Valhalla.”

There is just one exit strategy for Afghanistan. Nation building – from the bottom up. Afghans need roads, schools, security and a strong, clean and stable government. Putting all that in place can’t be done piecemeal. It will take money, time, coordination and patience.

I’m not suggesting that it will be easy. But the cost of not doing it could be unthinkable.  

A lot of people who visit my website leave comments supporting the global legalization of narcotics. Many describe America’s war on drugs ineffective, expensive and immoral. There are many proposals out there, like this recent cover story in the Economist, that discuss in detail how society could benefit from legalizing, regulating and taxing drugs.

I have been accused of being a warmonger and a prohibitionist. But as anyone who has read my book knows, it isn’t about whether drug use should be legal or not.

It’s about the fact that the Taliban and al Qaeda (whose fugitive leader has stated his intention to obtain weapons of mass destruction and use them against the United States) are earning hundreds of millions of dollars annually off the dope trade.

My goal is to educate people about the true nature of the insurgent and terror groups operating along the AfPak border. I believe the money they earn from drugs and other criminal activity represents an urgent global security threat, and that we must disrupt their source of funding.

P.S. For those who want to complain about prohibitionist drug policy, the way to actually have an impact is to relay your message to President Obama, the Department of Justice or your local congressperson.

On Sunday the New York Times published an interesting report about U.S. soldiers trying to secure Afghanistan’s Jalrez District, a fertile valley just east of the capital Kabul that was being terrorized by a combination of Taliban forces and local criminals. The story reports that the Taliban melted away when American forces appeared, and their main task now is targeting criminal groups “who may be thought of as Taliban, but whose main pursuit is money, not infidels.” 

Lt. Col. Kimo Gallahue, a commander of the U.S. battalion in Jalrez commented to the Times that, “I learned everything I know about the Jalrez insurgency from The Sopranos … At the foot soldier level, it’s economically driven.”

First off, from my research it is clear the insurgency — both in Afghanistan and Pakistan — is economically driven right up to the top of the command chain. But the point I want to make in this post is that it is absurd American troops have to take their cue from an HBO show. As the Obama administration overhauls its strategy towards Afghanistan, the Pentagon should train and equip U.S. fighting units in Afghanistan to counter an enemy that behaves more like a mafia force than an ideological guerilla army. That means, among other things, embedding law enforcement and counter-narcotics officers in military units deployed to Afghanistan, and also refashioning the training programs soldiers undergo before they deploy. A criminal intelligence investigation is different from a military intelligence operation, but the two can complement each other in the current environment in Afghanistan. U.S. and European officials should mull revisions to the mandate for NATO troops in Afghanistan that would allow them to combat criminal activity both by insurgents and corrupt officials in the Afghan government. Good governance in Afghanistan will be critical to any counter insurgency effort. 

The criminalized Taliban has not put aside its intention of driving western troops out of the country or launching lethal attacks, as the rising casualty rates indicate. In fact, involvement in crime has made the insurgency more violent and ruthless. 

In addition, there is evidence this planting season that Taliban forces in the country’s west are threatening farmers with dire consequences if they do not grow opium poppy. A report by the UN’s news service, IRIN, quoted poppy farmers in Farah province:

“The Taliban told me to grow poppies or I would be punished,” said Abdul Sattar, a farmer in the Poshtroad District, in southwestern Farah Province. 

“They say by growing opium [poppies] we are actually demonstrating our support for ‘jihad’ against the Americans,” said Abdul Majid, another farmer. 

The report goes onto say that Taliban forces in Farah have doubled the agricultural tax they normally impose on poppy farmers, this season saying they would cart off as much as 20 percent of their crop. In my research for Seeds of Terror, farmers in southern Afghanistan reported that Taliban soldiers usually carted off 10 percent of their crop — an agricultural tithe known locally as ushr.