A new report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gives a concise breakdown of the dramatic change, both in terms of U.S. military strategy and counternarcotics policy, toward Afghanistan since the Obama administration took office.
It’s worth a read, since it zeroes in on the “fruits of neglect” and the culture of impunity that created the problem, and because it pieces together various new intelligence and policy initiatives taking place to fight it. It also argues, correctly, for a new metric for measuring success in the counternarcotics fight and encourages the kind of rigorous debate the United States needs to be having about Afghanistan.
Read the full story here.
I have long been a fan of the brave and determined Afghan reporters at the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. They go into areas where few other journalists dare to tread and come back with balanced and insightful reports. If you want to keep up with what is going on in the countryside, read their dispatches.
Two reports out this week are especially good: This story examines the state of voter apathy in Helmand, where thousands of US and British troops are attempting an 11th hour effort to stabilize the province ahead of Aug 20 polls.
Engineer Abdul Hadi, the provincial head of the Independent Election Commission, said that Helmand would have 222 polling centres housing 1,092 polling stations.
But if the security situation does not improve markedly in the next two weeks, dozens of these centres could remain empty.
“You cannot conduct a military operation one day and expect people to come vote the next,” said Shah Nazar, a retired police officer. “People need to feel safe. But under these circumstances, nobody can participate in the elections.” (Read the full story here)
The IWPR reporter, Mohammad Ilyas Dayee, spoke to people in Marja, the scene of recent heavy fighting between the Marines and the Taliban, Musa Qala, a town the Taliban controlled for about four months in late 2006 and early 2007. It’s a sobering assessment of the chances of having a legitimate vote in the country’s largest province.
Meanwhile, another enterprising IWPR reporter actually traveled to a militant-controlled area to attend a rally of sorts where Mullahs were warning people not to vote:
The mullah spoke in generalities for a bit, asking people to maintain their unity. But slowly he came to his main point – exhorting people not to participate in the elections.
“These elections are a trick, a fraud perpetrated by western countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom,” he said. “Whoever participates in these elections will be shamed in front of Allah and his prophet.”
Ehsanullah Ehsan, a member of this group, had a black turban and black clothes. He looked like Taleban, and he told me that they had given speeches like this one in Karokh, Gozara and Oba districts of Herat province. The people in those areas had welcomed them warmly, he added, and the process was continuing.
Ehsan said that he himself had given some of the speeches, and added that participation in the elections was a very great crime.
“The Americans are just picking a puppet for themselves,” he said. “The president of Afghanistan is not going to be elected by the people.”
Ehsan urged participants at the gathering to tell their relatives not to vote.
The purpose of this counter-election propaganda was to motivate people to take up arms against foreign forces rather than vote, said Ehsan.
“Afghanistan has been invaded by these foreigners,” he said.
Ehsan knew how to play on people’s emotions. He talked about subjects designed to make people very angry, such as the cartoons of the prophet Muhammad published in western newspapers; the alleged abuse of the Koran by Americans; and the “genocide” caused by coalition forces’ bombardment of peaceful communities.
Ehsan told people that the foreigners had come to control our country and our people, and it was the job of each and every Afghan to spread the word that foreigners are the enemies of our culture and our religion.
Ehsan said that the mullahs did not belong to any specific group, but were just trying to serve Allah and rescue Afghanistan from the invasion of the infidels. He did say, however, that the mullahs were being financially supported by the Taleban.
Each of the mullahs had a mobile phone and modern weapons, and they were walking around the area without fear.
Their propaganda seemed to have an extraordinary impact on their audience. (Read the full story here)
It’s a fascinating read, and another indication of how badly NATO, the US military and the international community is losing the public relations war in the rural Pashtun south. It’s another example to me of how the West has deeply underestimated the enemy, and a sign of that old counterinsurgency dictum: “the best weapons don’t shoot.”
As the Obama administration and the Pentagon revamp strategy towards the region, an effective campaign to counter the insurgents’ misinformation campaign will be as critical to any effort to “clear, hold and build.”
In Afghanistan’s poppy-rich south and southwest, a raging insurgency intersects a thriving opium trade. This study examines how the Taliban profit from narcotics, probes how traffickers influence the strategic goals of the insurgency, and considers the extent to which narcotics are changing the nature of the insurgency itself. With thousands more U.S. troops deploying to Afghanistan, joined by hundreds of civilian partners as part of Washington’s reshaped strategy toward the region, understanding the nexus between traffickers and the Taliban could help build strategies to weaken the insurgents and to extend governance. This report argues that it is no longer possible to treat the insurgency and the drug trade as separate matters, to be handled by military and law enforcement, respectively.
Read the full report here.
President Obama doesn’t need to send any more American soldiers to Afghanistan. There’s no doubt country needs to be stabilized – and fast. But it would be more effective to send thousands of police officers: beat cops who would know how to walk the streets and round up the criminals who are terrorizing and destabilizing that country.
And I’m not just talking the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Read the full story here.
In June, I met with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to discuss how the drug trade benefits the Afghan Taliban. I urged him to pay close attention to the two history chapters of my book, Seeds of Terror, warning that Washington has a habit of making the same mistakes over and over in Afghanistan.
He assured me the Obama team had consulted with a raft of experts and historians, adding with a laugh: “We plan to make new mistakes.”
I am not entirely sure, however.
Read the full story here.
